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ARTICLE 
Moneylending and Moral Reasoning on the Capitalist Frontier in Kyrgyzstan 
Mathijs Pelkmans, London School of Economics and Political Science 
Damira Umetbaeva, European University Viadrina  
 
Abstract 
This article explores the links between informal moneylending and aspects of sociality and 
morality. It documents the moral reasoning and strategizing of two female moneylenders who 
operate in the radically destabilized context of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. By analyzing these 
women’s lending practices and the way they talk about their experiences, we are able to 
document in some detail the constitutive intertwinement of morality, sociality, and formality 
in the workings of credit and debt, and demonstrate how questionable behavior is transformed 
into moral practice. This in turn highlights important features of the post-Soviet capitalist 
frontier. [Keywords: Moneylending, morality, frontier, Central Asia, post-Soviet societies, 
economic anthropology] 
 
Introduction 
“[Lending] is a good thing! Even with interest—it is a very good thing. Most of my 
borrowers were grateful that I helped them to realize their projects. Those who were not 
thankful simply lacked intelligence” (Batma).  
“Men cannot work in such business. They don’t have the patience for it. Men can give 
money but they cannot take it back. Women can work in [moneylending] by shouting, by 
quarrelling, by fighting, whereas if a man would go to someone’s house and start shouting, 
he himself would be guilty” (Raya). 
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At the time of our conversations, Batma had worked as an informal moneylender for 
approximately 20 years.
1
 She was outspoken about her activities and her views, and she 
sounded sincere when she told us that “lending is a good thing” and explained that her work 
was appreciated by all borrowers with a functioning brain. Still, it was a bold and somewhat 
surprising statement, because when it comes to popular representations of moneylenders, 
Kyrgyzstan fits David Graeber’s observation that “Looking over world literature, it is almost 
impossible to find a single sympathetic representation of a moneylender—or anyway, a 
professional moneylender, which means by definition one who charges interest” (2011:10; 
see also Gregory 1997:211). But as tends to be the case with such general statements they 
leave interesting aspects unseen, in this case the ethical work carried out by the lenders and 
borrowers themselves. What Batma’s remarks suggests above all, and we will have time to 
review this in more depth later on, is that the morality of moneylending is constituted in the 
specifics of the exchange, part of the larger context in which it takes place, and is dependent 
on the lender’s ability to effectively anticipate and respond to complications. 
 The issue of gender was prominently present in the conversations we had with Batma 
and Raya, the two female moneylenders that are the focus of this article. The topic emerged 
when the women talked about themselves as mothers who were also the main providers and 
when explaining their moneylending tactics. Although Raya may not have used the subtlest 
of words when mentioning “shouting, quarrelling, and fighting,” the point that gender 
informs moneylending techniques contains important suggestions about the workings of 
power in these kinds of activities. As Batma had mentioned in several conversations, her 
position as a mother and a provider allowed her to put additional moral pressure on borrowers 
to repay their loans. All this suggests that moneylending is hard work that requires not only 
rhetorical skills but also constant moral reasoning with a keen eye for one’s social positioning. 
Moreover, whatever power differentials exist between lender and borrower, these can be 
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unstable and at risk of inversion. In short, the words and deeds of female lenders shed 
important light on the dynamics of moneylending, and allow us to better understand how 
gender, morality, and trust bespeak the issue of credit and debt.  
In recent years the topics of debt and credit have received plenty of attention from 
anthropologists. Among other things they have documented the nefarious effects of 
aggressive credit provision (Killick 2011, Guerin 2014); they have pointed out that the once 
popular microcredit schemes—now increasingly and negatively referred to as micro debt 
schemes—have inadvertently reproduced the inequalities they were supposed to overcome 
and turned people into vulnerable neoliberal subjects (Gregory 2012:385, Kar 2013); they 
have shown that it is unhelpful to take distinctions between formal and informal debt for 
granted (James 2012, Peebles 2010, Guerin 2014); and they have explored the complex 
relationships between debt and morality (Graeber 2011, Gregory 1997, 2012). This article 
contributes to these discussions by focusing on the lending practices and moral reasoning of 
informal lenders operating in a radically destabilized post-Soviet setting. 
What a review of the recent ethnographic literature also teaches is that in these 
discussions the perspective of the moneylenders is rarely explored systematically (but see 
Leyshon et al. 2006, Gregory 1997:211–232). This may be unsurprising—qualitative 
researchers tend to identify more with borrowers than lenders, and moneylenders often 
hesitate to volunteer information fearing negative legal or reputational consequences—but it 
prevents a fuller understanding of how (im)morality, (a)sociality, and (in)formality are 
constituted by, and constitutive of, the dynamics of credit and debt. One of the fascinating 
aspects of the moneylenders we followed is that while their practices qualified as usury in 
most places including Kyrgyzstan,
2
 and Soviet discourse would have vilified them as 
parasitic speculators, these “loan sharks” were able to justify their practices not only to 
themselves but also to others as those of pioneers and do-gooders. 
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As we will go on to show, this feat is highly suggestive of the economic environment 
in which these informal lenders operated. It was in relation to the conditions of instability and 
change that moneylenders could construe themselves as pioneers, as part of a civilizing 
mission. To illuminate the different aspects of this complex process, the following old 
definition of the frontier will prove useful. In Kristof’s words, the frontier “was the spearhead 
of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and the unknown . . . pioneer 
settlements of a forward moving culture bent on occupying the whole area” (1959:270). The 
first aspect that stands out in this definition is that of assumed superiority, which was also 
unmistakably present in Batma’s denouncement of those who lack intelligence. Second, like 
in this definition the moneylenders were keenly aware that they were operating in a context 
that lacked a stable financial and economic infrastructure, and as such was a space of 
uncertainty as well as opportunity. Third, these unregulated zones were changing, and were 
ultimately caught up in processes of domestication and regulation.
3
 Importantly, the notion 
that frontiers are empty and wild is always a construction that reflects the dominant societal 
perspective. In the case at hand, while from a capitalist perspective Kyrgyzstan was seen as a 
virgin land, this “frontier” bore the discursive and material imprints of the former Soviet 
empire, a legacy that affected economic relations and ideas and practices of moneylending. 
We suggest that in such a destabilized context, when social relations cannot be taken for 
granted and when legal and normative frameworks are in tension with economic practice, 
moral reasoning is particularly intense.
4
  
 In what follows we first provide an overview of the changing economic landscape—
the “capitalist frontier”—in Kyrgyzstan. We then shift perspective to our protagonists and 
follow their trajectories in the moneylending business. The following two sections cover 
crucial aspects of moneylending, starting with the topics of risk and decision-making in 
lending, to then move to the issue of repayment by focusing on problematic cases. Finally, we 
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analyze the presented stories and case materials through the prism of moral reasoning, 
demonstrating that the moral dimension is fundamental not only to the women’s self-image, 
but constitutive of the connection between lender and borrower, and thereby the 
moneylending business at large, and reflective of the capitalist frontier in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan.  
 
The Post-Soviet Capitalist Frontier 
The “falling apart” (raspad) of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a transformation of seismic 
magnitude. Not only did economic output collapse while levels of unemployment and 
poverty soared, it inaugurated a period of tremendous confusion and opportunity. The newly 
independent Republic of Kyrgyzstan was supposed to swiftly transition to a market 
democracy, but the political economic situation that emerged was hardly what the experts or 
“transitologists” had in mind.
5
 Locally referred to with the terms “chaos” and “wild market,” 
what emerged was a capitalist frontier, “an edge of space and time: a zone of not yet—not yet 
mapped, ‘not yet’ regulated” (Tsing 2003:5100). This chaotic space was not devoid of 
contours but carried the remainders of the crumbling Soviet system, a specter that profoundly 
affected the course of change. Three aspects of this multifaceted process are particularly 
relevant for our current purposes. First, the dismantling of the Soviet system enabled an 
unprecedented exercise of predatory accumulation, losely arranged around pre-existing but 
newly relevant societal distinctions.
6
 Second, with most people left to their own devices in an 
increasingly monetized context, the resulting demand for financial services offered great 
opportunities for private moneylenders. Third, this took place against the background of a 
Soviet discursive legacy that had vilified all capitalist practices, producing a morally 
ambiguous space that only gradually obtained new contours. It is worthwhile to elaborate on 
each of these aspects. 
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 In comparative Central Asian perspective, Kyrgyzstan’s dismantling of the Soviet 
planned economy was radical. The country adopted a shock therapy-type of transition 
strategy to quickly liberalize and privatize its economic system. But as transpired in later 
years, it did so with disastrous effects. The macroeconomic reforms were merely a façade that 
enabled a small group of well-placed political players to monopolize key assets. The reforms 
contributed to the rapid deterioration of the economic infrastructure, while failing to establish 
a sufficiently strong legal and economic framework that would allow for sustainable 
development. In this chaotic transformation away from a redistributive economy, money 
assumed an increasingly central role, at a moment when access to financial services was 
almost non-existent. The new centrality of money did not imply that personal networks 
(which had played such an important role in the Soviet “shortage economy”) were no longer 
relevant. What happened instead, to use Ledeneva’s (2006:1) characterization of post-Soviet 
Russia, was the “reorientation of the use of personal networks toward a new type of 
shortage—a shortage of money,” thereby generating “a whole new range of informal 
practices.”
7
 
 The features of the planned economy, in combination with the ubiquity of wage labor 
and the encompassing nature of welfare provisions meant that during Soviet times ordinary 
citizens had little need for financial services. This radically changed after 1991. Commercial 
banks had mushroomed in the 1990s, but their services were accessible to only a minority: in 
1998 an estimated 70 percent of the population lacked access to financial institutions 
(Wadhwa 1998:9). As a result of limited supply, high inflation rates and the absence of a 
robust legal framework, interest rates remained endemically high. Private moneylenders 
asked interest rates of 20 to 30 percent per month, while commercial banks applied rates of 
50 to 100 percent per year (Pelkmans 2003:187). Moreover, banks typically required a large 
number of official documents from their clients, which disproportionally affected the 
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transaction costs of small loans. In practice, most ordinary citizens in need of credit had to 
rely on family networks and private lenders. This started to change with the introduction of 
microcredit schemes and the establishment of credit unions, though these only became active 
on a larger scale only after the turn of the millennium (cf. Shamshieva 2006), and anyway 
were poorly attuned to the needs of many.  
Official Soviet discourse had portrayed bankers, pawnbrokers, moneylenders and 
other “capitalists” negatively as parasites preying on poor and honest workers. A good 
example of this negative portrayal is the 1966 film “Death of the Usurer” (Smert’ 
rostovshchika), which unfolds in pre-revolutionary Bukhara and revolves around the 
misfortunes of a poor, honest, and handsome worker and the vicious scheming of a rich, 
stingy, and hideously-looking moneylender.
8
 While in the 1990s such negative images 
continued to occasionally pop up in the local media, this has become increasingly rare since 
then. Significantly, any remaining negativity was easily shrugged off by the lenders 
themselves. Despite widespread nostalgia for the Soviet past, the Soviet condemnation of all 
private trading and entrepreneurial activity was rendered obsolete by the fact that such 
activities had become the standard—part and parcel of everyday reality. In fact, our 
interlocutors saw themselves as pioneers of sorts, who had overcome significant obstacles to 
reach entrepreneurial success in difficult conditions.  
Moreover, because negative Soviet rhetoric hardly differentiated between kinds of 
private entrepreneurial activities, moneylending came to be seen as equivalent to any other 
entrepreneurial activity. This equivalence was further imprinted by the fact that in the post-
Soviet era most private lenders combined moneylending with other economic activities. As 
has been noted in a study of informal financial services in neighboring Uzbekistan, most 
lenders were traders and businessmen for whom moneylending was part of a diverse set of 
business activities (Ruziev and Midmore 2014). Fitting this pattern, Batma and Raya both 
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continued their retail businesses as they developed and expanded their moneylending 
activities. 
 The “capitalist frontier” is a space of uncertainty and opportunity that requires 
economic as well as moral creativity.
9
 In this chaotic space there is a great need for financial 
services, producing lucrative possibilities for private moneylenders. These same conditions 
make moneylending a risky endeavor, and a morally ambiguous one. Such undefined spaces 
of uncertainty and opportunity tend to be of a temporary nature, eventually occluded by the 
strengthening of law and the sedimentation of dominant normative frameworks. In the case of 
Kyrgyzstan, however, their existence was protracted by the turmoil of two revolutions (in 
2005 and 2010) and the inability of the Kyrgyz government to sufficiently strengthen the rule 
of law. Much more can and needs to be said about these issues, and we will do so as they 
emerge while following the moneylenders and their activities. 
   
Becoming a Moneylender: Two Stories 
We asked Raya and Batma to talk about how they had become moneylenders and followed 
up with questions about the workings of their lending businesses, repeatedly pushing them for 
examples and detail. As is true for all life stories our narrators “selected, organized, 
connected, and evaluated” biographical elements (Riessman 2005) with the aim to be 
understood. Following Michael Jackson’s (2013:29) suggestion to see “storytelling as a form 
of ethical discourse,” we listened to how these moneylenders presented themselves as moral 
actors in a complex universe. The communicated messages are thus about more than the 
contained information, and these messages can be (partly) decoded by analyzing the stories’ 
narrative, performative, and contextual dimensions. That is, we use the life-story approach to 
gain insight in the workings of credit and debt as well as to obtain a record of the 
moneylenders’ explicit moral reasoning. 
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*** 
Born in 1978 in rural central Kyrgyzstan, Raya was in her mid-30s at the time of our 
conversations in 2015, and a single mother of two daughters (of 7 and 5 years old). Her 
parents had lived their entire life in the village. Her father used to be employed as a tractor 
driver (traktorist) and her mother as a tobacco collector in the local state farm (sovkhoz). 
Raya grew up alongside her four brothers. After having finished school she went to the city 
of Osh, where she lived with relatives while studying at a professional college to become a 
post-office employee.
10
 Upon completion of her studies Raya returned to the village and 
found work at the village’s primary school. She worked there until she got married, a 
marriage that lasted less than a year. It was at that point that she became involved in retail 
(she referred to this as kommertsia or commerce): 
 
At the time I was thinking: “how should I live now!?” I used to work at school before 
I got married. But the salary was so small, and anyway I had been interested in 
kommertsia since my childhood. Back then, my father would bring home bottles of 
wine and vodka and we would sell these from our home. . . So, after my divorce [in 
2007] I started kommertsia. 
 
Although she did not mention this explicitly herself, Raya’s position as a divorced mother, 
yet one with a strong kinship network in the village—especially her four brothers—was 
significant. It meant that she could assert herself as an independent economic actor, while 
simultaneously claiming moral respect.
11
 Raya’s retail business started with purchasing 
alcoholic and soft drinks from a factory where a close relative had a management position, to 
resell these from her house in the village. The business was a relative success and after she 
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had managed to accumulate a small yet significant sum of money she started lending to co-
villagers and acquaintances from neighboring villages.  
 Over the following years Raya’s lending activities became locally well known. Partly 
because she was the only person in her village publicly known to be lending money, she 
never had a shortage of clients and eventually worked with a client base of 25–30 
borrowers.
12
 She did not advertise her lending activities; rather, she emphasized, “people 
would come to me in need.” At the same time, and this was a recurrent theme in her stories, 
she “never stood out” from others as a lender, instead ensuring that her lending practices 
fitted into the local moral economy. When making decisions about whom to lend to, she 
would consider the social standing of the person and their wider family. She never asked for 
collateral and never wrote up formal contracts, but relied instead on social pressure to do its 
work. Parallel to her lending activities, Raya was part of a women’s collective that borrowed 
from the micro-credit institution Kompanion,
13
 and she continued to sell beverages from her 
home. That is to say, credit and debt had become an integral part of her economic endeavors: 
her vending activities provided the needed visibility and legitimacy; her lending activities 
produced the bulk of income; and her involvement with Kompanion provided a financial 
buffer for the unpredictable character of her trading and lending activities.  
After having been involved in moneylending for approximately five years, Raya 
interrupted her lending activities in 2014. The main reasons for her decision were difficulties 
with securing timely repayment of some of the bigger loans. Several clients who had 
borrowed large amounts (up to KGS 30 000 or USD 450)
14
 failed to repay either the interest 
or the loan itself. These defaults not only undermined the profitability of her lending 
activities but were also stressful, causing her to “worry constantly.” This is not to say that 
such defaults were entirely useless. In lieu of repaying in cash, several defaulters provided 
labor and construction materials (obtained through relatives) for Raya’s new and larger 
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grocery shop in the village center (until then she had been selling from her home). Having 
decided to restrict her activities to retail only, Raya invested the accumulated sum of KGS 
200,000 (USD 3,000) in the construction of this shop and the purchase of merchandise. She 
reflected on her decision as follows: 
 
It turns out that managing a shop is better than lending. When you have a shop there is 
an abundance of food and products to use at home—you have money, selling goes 
well, and you don’t have to wait for someone to return you the money . . . Lending 
money with interest (nasyaga akcha berüü) involves more risk. You constantly worry 
that [the clients] will not return the money, that they will run away. 
 
For Raya, one of the main difficulties was to maintain a balance between being seen as a 
respectable and good person on the one hand, and as a tough moneylender on the other. The 
interruption of her lending activities suggests that Raya was not entirely successful in 
maintaining this balance. Moreover, the stories demonstrate the extent to which her business 
choices were embedded in the realities of everyday life; a life in which family obligations and 
social reputation were as important as economic considerations, also but not only because 
these were essential to economic success. 
*** 
The experiences of Batma, our second moneylender, were quite different, but they resembled 
Raya’s in how she became a moneylender. Both women had been pushed into the role of 
provider at a time when they lacked stable jobs. If Raya underlined her status of divorced 
mother, Batma emphasized that her husband turned out to be a disappointment, economically 
speaking, requiring her to become the provider during difficult times. In her words, “it is 
because of his weakness that I have become tough.” 
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Born in 1960, Batma was 55 years old at the time of our conversations, married, a 
mother of two children and a grandmother of three. Her early adulthood had been relatively 
stable. She and her husband had jobs in a large factory in Osh, but when the factory closed its 
doors in 1992, the couple fell on economic hardship, not least because they had moved to the 
city as students and did not have a strong local kinship network to rely on. Their children 
were still small and had only started school in the early independence years. Batma said that 
at the time she used to worry day and night about what to do and how to earn money to 
provide for her family. Eventually she decided to start trading, baking bread rolls (bulochki) 
and sell these on the bazaar. The income generated through this venture was meager but 
sufficient to cover the household’s basic needs. This lasted for a couple of years, but bread 
baking lost its profitability by the late 1990s when larger bakeries emerged. By this point 
Batma had saved sufficient money to open a small shop in the bazaar where she sold cookies, 
sweets, and other sugar products.  
Meanwhile Batma had started to lend out the remainder of her savings, a sum of 200 
USD, initially to a neighbor and her sister’s husband. This, however, proved unsustainable 
and hardly profitable: problems arose with the neighbor’s repayments, while her sister’s 
husband was borrowing at the reduced rate of 5 percent per month, on what was only a small 
sum of money. Gradually, as profits from her shop increased, Batma expanded her client base. 
Reflecting back on this period (roughly from 2000 to 2005), she mentioned that 
moneylending was mostly a means to top up her income from trading. Batma’s children had 
come of age and the costs of supporting them while they studied in Kyrgyzstan’s capital 
Bishkek prevented her from quickly expanding her lending business. 
It was only after her son and daughter graduated from university in 2007 and became 
less financially dependent that Batma’s lending business fully flourished, while also making 
good profits from her shop in the bazaar. As she proudly stated: “I started with just 10,000 
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Som [KGS] from selling bread rolls, but I managed to turn those 10,000 Som into 10 million 
Som.” (These approximately 150,000 USD should be seen as her lifetime profits). Her 
colleagues in the bazaar were not aware of Batma’s financial success, as she continued to 
“work in a poor, small place, by being like a poor person.” This was a deliberate decision. 
She emphasized: “some people dress differently while at work, but I would work in the same 
clothes I wore at home.”  
In order to be closer to their children and grandchildren, Batma and her husband 
moved to Bishkek in 2010. Having developed moneylending into a 150,000 dollar business 
she was able to purchase four apartments in Bishkek in the early 2010s and still reserve a 
decent sum for lending practices. Batma’s shop in the bazaar and a reduced version of her 
lending business in Osh had since then been managed by her sister, who also took on 
responsibility for collecting the monthly payments and transferring the profits. Her main 
lending activities, however, Batma shifted to Bishkek. As a newcomer in the city, she decided 
to operate through a family friend with strong kinship, friendship and professional 
connections in the city. This arrangement was convenient for all the involved and meant that 
Batma could have a regular monthly income, with less personal involvement (and stress) in 
the actual lending activities. 
*** 
It would be impossible to measure exactly the degree to which the differences in success of 
these women were due to different environments (a rural backwater versus a dynamic city), 
different approaches to lending (blending in versus professional distance), different times 
(with Batma having started 10 years earlier), and to chance. But in any case it is not our aim 
to build a model that would explain success or failure. Rather, by exploring how these 
different aspects are reflected in two moneylending businesses, and were talked about by our 
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two interlocutors, we aim to provide complimentary perspectives on the meeting point 
between moneylending and morality.  
 Seen from this perspective it is easy to see how the stories converge. Having fallen on 
economic hardship, not being able to rely on strong support networks and lacking higher 
education degrees, both women had faced the dilemma of how to survive not only 
economically, but also socially and morally. They made use of their significant verbal and 
social skills to deal with an imminent crisis in which they could not rely on a male provider. 
That is to say, in terms of social position, motivation, and enabling factors they were 
strikingly similar. They also both took pride in having become successful entrepreneurs. 
However, Raya’s close-knit rural setting was very different from Batma’s more anonymous 
terrain of operation, with different possibilities and different challenges for their respective 
businesses, each demanding its own approach for aligning economic, social, and moral 
concerns. 
 
“Knowing Them” . . . and Other Ways of Dealing with Risk 
Our interlocutors referred to their moneylending activities simply as their work (ish) or 
business (biznes). When pushed for more information they clarified that they “give money 
with interest” (protsentke akcha berüü or karyzga akcha berüü). By its very nature informal 
moneylending follows no formal regulations, and practices vary in terms of lending size, 
credit period, and level of institutionalization. Nevertheless, when people would speak of 
“giving money with interest” the common referent would be the provision of loans for a 
relatively short period (months rather than years) at high interest rates by an individual who is 
not acting as a representative of a financial institution.  
The segment of moneylenders that we are interested in mostly dealt with small to 
medium-sized loans in the range of KGS 5,000 to 100,000. Most of these lenders combined 
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moneylending with other economic activities in trade or production, which served to anchor 
their lending activities. Typically they charged interest rates that were well above those of 
formal lending institutions.
15
 Among private lenders the typical interest rate was 10 percent 
per month for “standard” loans, a rate that was also applied by Batma and Raya. A higher rate 
of usually 15 percent was charged in the case of very small loans (below 5,000 KGS) or when 
the lending term was particularly short (under a month). Lower rates were applied to reliable 
repeat clients, sometimes reducing the interest rate to 5 percent per month or calculating 
interest over only a part of the loan. Such discounts were also given to significantly related 
borrowers such as neighbors and distant relatives; close relatives (essentially those belonging 
to the patrilineal group) were not charged any interest. 
 The high interest rates in private lending suggest that potential borrowers have a 
number of distinct characteristics. They either do not have or do not want access to lower-
interest credits offered by formal financial institutions—banks, credit unions, microcredit 
companies. Sometimes the reason is simply that potential borrowers lack the required 
documentation, or do not want to invest the time and money needed to obtain them. This is 
particularly common for small loans and for those that are time sensitive. In such instances, 
the relative speed and more flexible means of assessment of informal moneylenders provides 
a clear advantage. Other common reasons for borrowers to lack access to formal lending 
institutions include having outstanding debts, having insufficient collateral, or intending to 
use the money for non-qualifying purposes (and being unable to provide an adequate smoke 
screen). The implication is that the risks of lending to such borrowers—at least as seen from 
the perspective of a financial institution—are relatively high.
16
 Batma and Raya were aware 
of the risks and engaged with them directly, even if differently. 
*** 
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On the face of it, Raya entertained a minimalist approach to checking the credentials of 
potential clients. She put it as follows: “I did not choose my clients. Instead they would come 
to me because they were in need. Usually I would believe them, thinking: ‘surely they will 
give the money back in the end.’” When encouraged to elaborate she added: “I would give to 
those I knew and would not give to those I did not know. I would not trust people who came 
from afar and whom I did not know. I would trust people from the village.” She added that 
sometimes she would agree to lend money to people from other villages, but only if contact 
had been established through trusted intermediaries.  
Raya’s comments may appear somewhat empty and perhaps even naive, but they 
reveal much about the possibilities and procedures for client assessment in the rural setting 
where she operated. They suggest, first, that clients were only considered if they were already 
part of the lender’s larger social network. Second, they suggest that lending decisions were 
made on the basis of the social standing of a person and their family, as this indicated the 
likelihood of economic success and actual repayment. Raya’s intimate knowledge of her 
potential clients allowed her, in principle, to make informed decisions. But the density of 
networks also limited her decisions because rejecting a potential borrower could negatively 
affect her reputation. Moreover, she said, she sometimes provided a loan because of 
compassionate feelings, having taken pity on her borrowers’ problems, even when her 
intuition told her not to go ahead.
17
 Perhaps it is because of this that Raya emphasized 
repeatedly that her clients had been the ones who approached her with their request. That is, 
mentioning these requests did not only convey to us the moral conundrums involved in 
moneylending decisions; the requests themselves were important because they allowed Raya 
to apply social and moral pressure on her clients. 
Considerations of proper social conduct played a key role when deciding to whom 
and on what conditions to supply loans. Raya emphasized that it would not have been right 
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for her to ask borrowers to write statements of indebtedness or to demand gold (i.e. jewelry) 
deposits or identity documents as collateral to ensure trouble-free repayment. She pointed out 
that such formalities and guarantees would imply that she mistrusted her clients. Instead, she 
would tell her clients—some of whom brought their passports—the following: “I would say, 
‘we live in one village. I know that you will not move to another place, and that of course you 
will [act responsibly and] return the money.’” These informal mechanisms tended to work 
because the reputation of both lender and borrower depended on them. Indeed, Raya felt that 
she did not need to be too strict in her profiling, precisely because the density of networks 
provided a strong incentive for borrowers to return the money. In hindsight though, she 
mentioned that she should have been more selective and required more guarantees from 
lenders, as this would have reduced the risk of non-repayment. But at the time she had 
prioritized village norms according to which asking for documentation “would have been 
shameful.”  
*** 
Similar to Raya, Batma only lent money to people she already knew. The difference was that 
while Raya tended to know not only her clients but also their families and neighbors, Batma 
knew her clients mostly through work-related encounters. She lent money to vendors working 
in the same bazaar, to owners of cafes and restaurants, and to local firms that supplied 
merchandise to vendors.  
Of the many lending transactions, the riskiest were when exceptionally, Batma 
decided to lend the huge sum of KGS one million (USD 15,000) to two Turkish businessmen 
for periods of one to two months at a time. The men had approached Batma through an 
intermediary—a Russian vendor working near Batma in the bazaar. She handed over the 
money only after she had collected their written statements as well as passports of the 
businessmen’s family members, but nevertheless she was so worried that she could not sleep 
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for days, despite taking sleeping pills.
18
 These risky transactions never caused any actual 
problems, and they allowed Batma to quickly expand her lending business.  
How, then, did Batma deal with the issue of risk? Unlike Raya, Batma tried to obtain 
hard guarantees from her borrowers to reduce the risk of non-repayment. In cases that she 
deemed particularly risky she required physical collateral such as identity and property 
documents, marriage and birth certificates, or jewelry. In most cases, however, she was 
satisfied with her borrowers writing a statement of indebtedness. Arguably, if such statements 
had been brought to court they could have been revealed to carry little if any legal weight.
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Nevertheless, the borrowers treated the statements with great respect and Batma recounted 
with glee how she had insisted upon such written statements even when her borrowers tried 
to get out of writing them. Importantly, the statements fitted her overall approach to lending, 
one which centered on her ideas of professionalism. The key issue for Batma was to maintain 
a clear distance from her borrowers. This was even true of regular borrowers with whom she 
developed friendly relationships, but in which case the borrowers were expected to treat 
Batma with deference and respect.  
Batma had always tried to keep a low profile when doing business to avoid that her 
clients (and state functionaries) would be aware of her wealth, but within her own extended 
family it was known that she was doing well. Several of her cognates (who live in a rural 
setting) had requested that she would lend them money as well, but she always resisted this 
because, as she put it, “it will ruin relationships.” Things were different with her husband’s 
relatives, most of whom lived in and around Bishkek and were of higher socio-economic 
status than her blood relatives. The fact that in-laws are considered more distant kin, 
combined with Batma’s dependence on them for economic and social advancement in the 
city, were likely factors in Batma’s decision to lend them money in spite of the potential 
pitfalls. She did not calculate interest when lending money to her in-laws, but she did expect 
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them to reciprocate, for example, by attending and helping out at family events. The very 
minimum, in her view, was that her in-laws should return the loan when asked and express 
gratitude when doing so. She was repeatedly disappointed in these expectations, vowed not to 
lend any money to them again, yet family pressure was such that she would give in and 
provide new loans. 
*** 
The issue of scale helps understand the differences between Raya and Batma. Raya worked in 
a rural area that was relatively remote from urban centers, where she and her relatives had 
lived for generations. As a result, it was not just that Raya knew most of her clients; she also 
knew most of the people her clients knew. Moreover, those clients, and the people those 
clients knew, were aware of Raya’s actions. On the one hand, this simplified assessment of 
potential clients and meant that clients felt social pressure to repay. On the other hand, it 
limited Raya’s ability to create “professional distance,” which meant that refusing clients and 
forcing repayment was tricky. Batma’s situation was almost the mirror opposite. She had 
little knowledge of her clients’ backgrounds, and moreover those clients knew little about her. 
The larger urban context allowed Batma to create professional distance between her and her 
clients, and thus to insist on formal documentation and procedures. These differentials of 
seeing and knowing, and of being seen and known, significantly affected the women’s 
decisions and mode of conduct.  
 
“Talking Convincingly” . . . and Other Ways to Force Repayment  
With a monthly interest of 10 percent there was a constant tension between profit and 
sustainability, and a very real risk that any unpaid interest would rapidly spiral out of control. 
Although most clients made their payments on time and without causing trouble, repayment 
could not be taken for granted and often required work. One of the interesting tensions in all 
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moneylending is that the lenders benefit most when borrowers are unable to quickly repay 
their debt, and instead keep on paying the monthly interest.
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 That is to say, there is a delicate 
balance between increased profits to be had from borrowers who delay repayment, and those 
who actually default. It is for this reason that failure to pay is not immediately problematic. 
Or as Raya explained: “We say, ‘let it accumulate and then we will take it.’” Still, it was 
fairly common for them to remind borrowers that payments needed to be made—applying 
some pressure was part of the routine. But in a few cases repayment became a real problem. 
In this section we focus on the techniques that lenders employ in such instances.  
The first cluster of techniques revolves around applying moral pressure, that is, they 
cleverly engaged with the debtor’s moral impulse to repay (Graeber 2011:12–13) to increase 
feelings of guilt and compassion in the borrower. Batma and Raya regularly used such 
techniques, either over the phone or during face to face conversations. They would emphasize 
that the borrowers should not take advantage of them and that they simply owed the money. 
Raya mentioned that she always reminded her borrowers that they had been the ones who had 
requested the loan when they were in need and therefore had no right to behave ungratefully 
and dishonestly towards her. She often emphasized her own vulnerabilities, such as in one 
instance when she told a defaulter: “‘Unlike you I don’t have a husband—I need to feed my 
two daughters. I gave you the money because you said you needed it and asked for my help. I 
helped you then, so what you are doing to me now is not right.” Similarly, when Batma still 
lived in Osh and had children at university she would tell unforthcoming borrowers that she 
had to pay her children’s tuition fees; that surely the borrowers did not want to be responsible 
for her children being forced out of university; and that therefore they should return the 
money as agreed. She explained: “sometimes I speak strictly with borrowers, and I will say: 
‘I gave you money when you were in need. Now it is me who is in need, who has difficulties. 
It is your obligation to return the money to me.’” 
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 Raya and Batma explained that the key to repayment was to sound convincing. They 
did this by engaging directly with their borrowers’ sense of justice and their understanding of 
economic processes. Sometimes they would borrow phrases and arguments from other 
lenders and from their intermediaries. Raya remembered one particularly powerful train of 
thought used by an intermediary when demanding repayment from a debtor: “when I lent you 
this money I was going to use it to buy a calf for myself. It has been two years since, and the 
calf would have become a cow. So now you pay me the price of a cow.” Since she had heard 
it, Raya had used it several times in conversations with borrowers.  
Talking convincingly was usually sufficient to speed up repayment, but sometimes it was 
necessary to intensify its effect through social pressure, that is, by distributing guilt among a 
number of interconnected people. If a loan was brokered by intermediaries, then they were 
mobilized first to apply pressure on the debtors; relatives and witnesses to the transfer could 
also be approached. This application of social pressure tends to work because the reputation 
of intermediaries, witnesses, and relatives is linked to that of the debtor. The mechanism was 
most forceful in close-knit communities such as the rural setting in which Raya operated, but 
precisely because of this it also had the potential to backfire. Raya was well aware of this. 
When trying to retrieve money from a debtor who had relocated to Bishkek, she had enlisted 
the help of the intermediary to negotiate with the debtor’s mother to see if the money could 
be returned. But she stopped short of demanding the money from the mother or other 
relatives, because she feared that this would result in them speaking poorly of her, which 
would endanger her relationships with other villagers.  
The above examples demonstrate that moneylenders need to walk a fine line. Indeed, 
social and moral pressure only works as long as the lender’s own position is secure. Raya 
explained: “If people in the village think poorly of you, or if you damage your relationship 
with them, they will not return the money. So you need to manipulate them, through lying 
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and flattery.” Similar logics were at work in urban settings. However, the more differentiated 
environment meant on the one hand that social pressure had less force, and on the other that 
lenders did not have to watch their moral standing as carefully as in rural settings. The 
following example presented by Batma illustrates this. One of her borrowers had approached 
Batma through a trusted intermediary. However, within a month after receiving the loan this 
middle-aged male borrower disappeared to Russia. Batma made daily calls to the 
intermediary and would shout at and curse them for not returning her honestly earned money. 
She went to the borrower’s house and threatened his mother to take possession of the house if 
her son would not return the debt. Eventually he repaid the principal sum but without the 
accumulated interest. Batma settled for this outcome, rationalizing that the man was in so 
much debt that he had taken up work in Russia to be able to repay his many creditors.  
This brings us to the next means of facilitating repayment, which is used only as a last 
resort—the threat of force. This threat can be made through the police or through racketeers 
(reketter; reketiry) or strongmen (chernye, literally “black ones”), all of whom are generally 
feared. Raya recounted the example of one borrower who failed to repay a significant loan 
even after his mother and the mediator (who had facilitated the deal) had put pressure on him. 
Raya then turned to the district (raion) police commander. Although not having written proof 
of the loan, she managed to enlist the commander’s help by “talking convincingly” 
(ishendirip aittym) and emphasizing how her trust had been violated. The commander 
proceeded by making a phone call to the duty officer in the relevant village. The officer 
accompanied Raya to the borrower’s mother and warned the mother that her son would be 
put in jail if not repaying his debt. The threat was effective. The loan plus accumulated 
interest (200 percent of the original sum) was speedily repaid, after which Raya thanked the 
policeman by buying him a sheep costing one third of the repaid sum.
21
 According to Raya 
the police usually avoid getting involved in the recuperation of debt when written evidence is 
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lacking, and in such instances they advise moneylenders to enlist the assistance of racketeers. 
In this case an exception was made because Raya was personally acquainted with the district 
police commander. 
Contrary to Raya, and despite having dealt with several defaulting borrowers, Batma 
never enlisted the assistance of the police or of racketeers. She explained her reticence by 
pointing out that enlisting the help of the police could easily backfire. Her lending activities, 
after all, were hardly legal and thus best kept away from the authorities. Instead she relied on 
her own ability to act tough and professional vis-à-vis borrowers, even aggressive when 
necessary. In those rare instances when repayment could not be secured even after repeated 
attempts (which would include visits accompanied by intermediaries or others), she 
concluded the issue by cursing the borrowed money, and vouching not ever to accept the 
money back. Batma emphasized that her curse was effective, as exemplified by one family 
who subsequently lost their house (in a fire) and a female borrower who ended up being 
married to an alcoholic in Russia, cut off from her children and relatives in Kyrgyzstan. In 
Batma’s view it was because she had earned her money with honest and hard work, that God 
punished such dishonest borrowers.  
These last examples indicate a final means of dealing with non-repayment—which is to 
accept the reality of occasional default. Batma and Raya had both offered deals to unfortunate 
borrowers, such as settling for repayment of the principal while pardoning the accumulated 
interest, reducing the interest rate, or occasionally even pardoning the entire debt. Although 
such outcomes were disappointing to the lenders, they came to terms with them by citing the 
misfortunes of their debtors or even hypothetically contributing to these through cursing the 
money. Coming to terms with non-repayment was easiest when it concerned long-term 
borrowers. Batma provided an example when she talked about an Uzbek borrower who had 
permanently migrated to Russia after the 2010 conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, during 
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which his shop was looted and his local economic prospects were lost. The man had 
borrowed 60,000 KGS and had paid his 10 percent monthly interest for about three years. 
Batma told herself (and us in conversation) that this was fine because his monthly payments 
had already exceeded the amount of the original debt.  
 
Morality on the Frontier  
The moneylending practices documented in this paper characterized the post-Soviet condition: 
a money-centered universe—one in which social connectedness was crucial, uncertainties 
were ubiquitous, and the risk of failure and destitution omnipresent. In this situation where 
demand for credit was high yet the financial infrastructure feeble, the punitively high 
percentages demanded by informal moneylenders were often accepted, even though this often 
led to difficulties of repayment. These features suggest that moneylenders could easily have 
been depicted as the embodiment of societal wrongs. And yet, the collapse of the economic 
infrastructure and the generalization of strategies of private accumulation throughout Kyrgyz 
society also meant that moneylending had become acceptable, and that moneylenders were 
able to present themselves as pioneers of a new, “capitalist” civilization. In fact, Batma 
always talked proudly of her moneylending activities, emphasizing that she had helped her 
borrowers to realize their projects at times when access to money was rare. In the encounters 
that we witnessed, borrowers never challenged this perspective, suggesting that the lenders’ 
ethical work was recognized by borrowers. This obviously does not mean that they 
wholeheartedly agreed with the lenders, but it is significant that they did not reject it outright. 
In casual conversations this translated into a kind of ambivalence towards lenders. As an 
acquaintance, who had resorted to informal moneylenders several times, expressed it: “you 
are grateful when they hand you the money, but you speak badly when you need to repay.”
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Rasanayagam (2011:11) has emphasized that it is the “transcendental quality of 
experience that enables moral reasoning,” and we would add that it is because of this quality 
that moral reasoning has an audience. Indeed, when lenders highlighted the need to “talk 
convincingly” they were talking about the importance of finding points of engagement that 
their borrowers would recognize: the difficulty of providing for children, the simple fact that 
domestic animals increase in value while raised, even the cursing of money. And one could 
argue that it is through moral reasoning that the “transcendental social” (Bloch 2013) is being 
subjectively constituted. The moneylenders’ conviction that “moneylending is a good thing” 
gained substance in their stories in which they survived as moral persons operating in chaotic 
contexts, while offering others the possibility to accomplishing their life projects. The stories 
thus showed how the ethics of survival bespeak larger questions of morality, showing how 
“immoral” activities can be transformed into building blocks of a moral life.  
In her work on Wall Street traders, Karen Ho (2012:414) has argued that we need to 
“understand capitalism as an explicitly moral order” that allows its “practitioners” to “co-
produce and often legitimate the moral order of finance.” Her argument goes some way to 
explain the moral righteousness claimed by “bankers” even after the 2008 financial crisis. 
While the context is radically different, the moneylenders in this article occupied similar 
embodied dispositions, thereby contributing to the emergence of such a new moral order. 
This new order, however, was a distinctly post-Soviet one. Here, moneylending was as much 
about economic survival and profit-making as it was about weaving together the fractured 
socio-economic fabric. The female moneylenders in this article actively navigated the social 
landscape. They presented themselves as post-Soviet citizens who were struggling to provide 
for their families. They reasoned that as women they were seen as less immediately 
threatening and hence could prosper in an environment that depended on the balancing of 
sociality, formality, and morality. Indeed, their balancing was fully in tune with the 
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contradictions of the frontier and its conflicting complexes of value—of different normative 
orders which were being constituted and arranged in the very process of engagement. 
In order to drive home these points about economic contradictions and moral flexibility 
on the frontier, one final example of stalled repayment will be illustrative. One of Batma’s 
clients had been borrowing KGS 100,000 for about 10 years. During all those years the client 
had made regular monthly interest payments of KGS 10,000, but in recent months  had 
started to delay her payments. While this development was clearly upsetting for Batma, in 
offhand conversation she mentioned that according to a rule—which she never specified 
except for saying that this is how formal lending through banks functions—she did not have 
the right to demand further payments, not even the repayment of the original debt. 
Nevertheless, Batma continued to phone the woman almost daily and had her sister (Batma’s 
caretaker in Osh) visit the debtor at home to demand payment of interest or alternatively 
repayment of the principal. The debtor then visited Batma in Bishkek to request debt relief, 
citing that she had been paying interest for many years and was having problems in her 
business (due to family tensions).
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 But in return Batma asked understanding for her own 
difficulties, such as having an unemployed husband. Eventually, they agreed to cut the 
interest rate, down to monthly payments of KGS 5,000. Batma said that she did not expect 
the principal sum ever to be repaid, but was simply trying to squeeze out interest payments 
for as long as possible. The mysterious “rule” is intriguing precisely because Batma took it up 
and discarded it with equal ease, demonstrating a skillful juggling of contrary moral positions. 
As such it is illustrative of the crevices in the normative landscape on the frontier. By 
invoking “the rule” Batma could come to terms with violations of an agreement, and adjust 
lending terms without feeling that she was giving up what was rightly hers. But she would 
invoke the rule only in the last instance, and even then she still tried to recuperate the debt.  
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Tsing writes that on the frontier “the lines between public, private, and criminal enterprise 
were unclear” (2003:5102; cf. Roitman 2005:101). In this article, such lack of clarity was 
exemplified by Batma’s haphazard invocations of “the rule” and Raya’s illegal eliciting of 
police assistance. This is not to say that the ambiguities of the frontier are static. Moral 
reasoning intensifies when the status-quo is challenged, and hence Batma’s awareness of “the 
rule” suggested the gradual sedimentation of legal and normative orders. As mentioned 
earlier, Kyrgyzstan adopted a usury law in 2013, which stipulated that interest rates above 35 
to 40 percent per annum would henceforth be illegal.
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 It suggested that Batma was unlikely 
to ever be able to formalize her lending business. Moreover, in recent years Batma had 
started to receive occasional criticism that her activities were in conflict with Islam (that they 
were haram). In one memorable event, her sister-in-law had brought it up during a heated 
argument at a family event. Batma had countered that her practices were no different from 
those of commercial banks.
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 But it had nevertheless bothered her. Perhaps this was because 
even though she could still win the argument, it suggested that the window of opportunity 
was closing down, that the post-Soviet capitalist frontier was finally being tamed. With the 
gradual institutionalization of the financial landscape in Kyrgyzstan it may well be that the 
interest rates go down, but that at the same time the terms of debt will become less negotiable. 
Less exacting yet more threatening to vulnerable borrowers? It is quite possible.  
 
Endnotes: 
                                                 
1
 We have replaced the names of our interlocutors with pseudonyms, choosing alternatives 
that are sensitive to the generational, regional, and ethnic connotations of personal names.  
2
 The Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan “On the restriction of usury practices in the Kyrgyz 
Republic,” adopted on June 20, 2013, banned the practices described in this article. See 
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http://finsabat.kg/?p=3577. Last accessed on June 5, 2018. However, it is still unclear if and 
how this recent law will affect these informal lending practices.  
3
 See Chappell (1993:270) and Baud and Van Schendel (1997:213) for elements of this 
definition of the frontier, and its critical grounding in Frederick Jackson Turner’s (1921) 
discussion of the frontier in US history. 
4
 This line of reasoning is similar to Zigon’s (2007) idea of moral breakdown, which uses 
Heidegger’s (1996) argument from Being and Time to suggest that it is under duress that 
people become more conscious of their surroundings. It also resonates with Laidlaw’s (2014) 
suggestion that moral reasoning arises from the inchoate nature of the normative landscape, 
which requires people to constantly reposition themselves through ethical work.  
5
 For a comprehensive critique of the assumptions underlying the transition paradigm see 
Carothers (2002); for an extensive discussion of how this worked out in Kyrgyzstan see 
Pelkmans (2017:17–45). 
6
 Humphrey (2002:97) helpfully argues that the end of Soviet governmentality revealed a 
“variety of idiosyncratic resources” that reproduce and often exacerbate socio-economic, 
ethnic, and religious distinctions. 
7
 For an insightful study of these reconfigurations of political and economic structures around 
principles of kinship and ethnicity in Kyrgyzstan, see Aksana Ismailbekova’s (2017) book 
Blood Ties and the Native Son (2017). 
8
 Another Soviet example is the 1979 film “The Hussar’s Engagement” (Svatovstvo gusara) 
in which a military officer falls in love with the daughter of a usurer, and has to come up with 
a smart plan to overcome the possessive and greedy behavior of the old man.   
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9
 Magnus Marsden (2016:307, 310) uses the term “interstitial space” to refer to such frontiers, 
similarly arguing that the “skills of adaptability and cleverness” are not only needed in 
economic enterprise but also in understanding “what it means to be human.” 
10
 The topic of her studies was of little importance; the aim was rather to have any kind of 
post-school education in a city, as this would facilitate getting a white-collar job back in the 
village. Raya failed to pass the entry exams for university, but with assistance from a relative 
she managed to enroll at a professional college in Osh.  
11
 It needs emphasizing that in Kyrgyzstan divorce is relatively common and does not lead to 
widespread stigmatization, even if it is often accompanied by morally charged accusations 
between the involved families. 
12
 As this story suggests, one cannot say exactly when Raya became a “moneylender.” 
Informal moneylending is a widespread practice in Kyrgyzstan, but it is only when lenders 
work with multiple borrowers who are not all family or friends, and demand monthly interest 
payments, that they are referred to as moneylender, literally, “someone who gives money 
with interest.”  
13
 Kompanion describes itself as a “community development financial institution,” which was 
registered with the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2004. Kompanion grew out of 
several microfinance projects that were operated by the global aid agency Mercy Corps in 
Kyrgyzstan since 1997. 
14
 KGS stands for Kyrgyz Som, the national currency of Kyrgyzstan. The currency was 
introduced in 1993 at a rate of KGS 10 to the dollar (USD), dropped significantly in the five 
years thereafter to KGS 50 to the dollar, and declined more slowly between 2000 and 2016 
when it came to be valued at KGS 67 to the dollar. 
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15
 The interest rates of financial institutions vary greatly, but in 2012 the average annual 
interest rate was 24 percent for banks and 38 percent for microfinance institutions 
(Temirbekova 2012:22). 
16
 This corresponds to studies of informal lending in Uzbekistan (Ruziev and Midmore 2014) 
and home-collected lending in England (Leyshon et al. 2006). 
17
 Raya did not lend money to everyone in the village, but refusing a genuine request was 
difficult, as illustrated by the following example. At one point Raya had refused the request 
of a man, around 60 years of age, who was known as an alcoholic. However, after his son 
explained to her how the money would be used and agreed to act as a guarantor, Raya 
decided nevertheless to provide the loan.  
18
 This may be because the medication she took (Dinidrol or diphenhydramine) builds 
tolerance fast and after several days is known to have no more effect than a placebo. 
19
 We say “could have been” because the pervasiveness of informal arrangements in the 
courts of justice meant that such documentation could nevertheless carry weight, depending 
on the social connections between plaintiff, prosecutor, judge, and defendant. 
20
 This is even more the case with formal lending institutions, which apply fines or increased 
interest rates on late payments, a practice not carried out by the private lenders in this article. 
21
 Several sources indicated that when strongmen are enlisted in the recovery of a debt they 
typically receive one third of the repaid amount. 
22
 Hrustič (2016) reports that the attitudes of Roma borrowers towards usurers in Slovakia 
were more positive than he had expected and Killick (2011) notices relatively warm 
relationships between borrowers and subprime lenders. In their explanations they both 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
emphasize the importance of personal relationships in times of need, aspects that we have 
also emphasized throughout this article. 
23
 The difficulties were related to claims made by the borrower’s in-laws on the family 
business that she had been managing since her husband had died several years previously. 
24
 The law stipulates that interest rates are permissible if they fall within the average weighted 
rate of the Bank of Kyrgyzstan, plus 15 percent. The average weighted rate was established at 
21.22 percent in 2016, allowing for interest rates up to 36.22 percent per annum. See 
http://finsabat.kg/?p=3577. Last accessed on July 20, 2016. 
25
 The example also suggests that Islamic finance (with its ban of interest on loans) was still 
not widely known or accepted, even though some reports suggest that it is gaining ground in 
the region (Hoggarth 2016).  
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